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One of the original goals of the IIASA project on Implementation and Effectiveness of 
International Environmental Commitments (IEC) was to explore the possibility of using 
simulation or gaming techniques as a way of giving policy-makers a better understanding of 
the problems of developing and implementing international environmental agreements. 
Simulation has been used successfully to understand various complex policy, decision, and 
negotiation processes, but prior to this project had not been applied to the problem of 
implementing agreements once they have been negotiated. Professor Edward Parson of 
Harvard University undertook to develop a simulation exercise concerned with 
implementation of a global climate agreement as part of the IEC project. The approach and 
results of that experiment are presented in IIASA Working Paper WP-96-90. In this 
companion paper, Professor Parson considers the more general applicability, promise, and 
limits of simulation and related methods as assessment tools for global environmental 
problems. 
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It has been widely argued that issues of global environmental change are so novel, unique, 
and complex that they pose unprecedented challenges to policy and management.' This paper 
considers the implications of this claim for the methods and procedures used to inform 
policy-making.' Complex issues such as global environmental change, which have strong 
scientific and technical components, normally require expert advice for rational and informed 
policy-making. The processes of providing such advice, by gathering, synthesizing, 
interpreting, and communicating knowledge from various domains and disciplines, to help 
responsible policy actors think about problems or evaluate possible actions, are normally 
called assessment or synthesis. (Brewer, 1986; Carnegie Commission, 1992; Parson 1994, 
1995). 
Many methods for organizing and doing assessment have been proposed, but two dominate 
current practice: formal models, and multidisciplinary expert panels. This paper argues that 
global-change issues pose various kinds of knowledge needs, some of which these 
conventional methods can usefully address, and some of which they are systematically ill- 
equipped to address. To meet the knowledge needs that are ill-met by conventional methods, 
'These claims of novelty are similar, whether global environmental issues are conceptualized as negotiations 
(Susskind, 1994, p. 6-7), as international regimes (Young, 1989, 1994), or as problems of international law 
(Brown Weiss 1993; Sand 1990, 1993; Sands, 1994). 
<ilobal environmental change takes multiple forms, but this paper illustrates assessment challenges using 
climate change --  the most salient, controversial, and complex global-change issue currently on the agenda. 
'fhe arguments presented here also apply to other global-change issues, even more strongly if -- as has often 
been argued -- multiple coupled global-change issues (e.g., climate, stratospheric ozone, acidification, and 
regional and long-range air pollution) are assessed and managed jointly. 
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the paper argues for the use of a set of unconventional assessment methods, known by 
various names including Policy Exercises, simulation-gaming, and scenario exercises. These 
alternative methods, if designed and implemented skillfully and interpreted with appropriate 
caution. can make valuable incremental contributions to well-informed global-change policy. 
The high stakes of global-change issues can make these potential contributions worth the 
considerable expense and difficulty of using such methods. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 1 discusses the variety of knowledge needs of 
global environmental policy, and proposes a taxonomy to organize them. Section 2 reviews 
the two conventional methods normally used to help inform such policy choices, and 
summarizes their strengths and their most significant limitations. Section 3 introduces the 
proposed alternative methods, identifies their common characteristics, and summarizes their 
use in other policy areas. Section 4 argues that these methods can help advance 
understanding in ways that complement the weaknesses of conventional methods, and that 
address some of the most intractable characteristics of global environmental problems. 
Scction 5 identifies the most serious risks and cautions associated with these methods, while 
Scction 6 draws brief conclusions. 
1.1 Global Environmental Problems, and What Makes Them Hard 
Global environmental issues have high stakes, and exhibit two characteristic classes of 
difficulties, which will here be called "complexity" and "obscurity".' Whether or not these 
difficulties are as unique or unprecedented as has been claimed, the challenges they pose to 
both policy-making and assessment are serious. For assessment, they affect what questions 
are relevant. what answers are reasonably attainable, and what methods are likely to be 
useful. 
By "complexity", I mean complexity of decision and policy-making. It includes, but is 
broader than, political conflict. Global environmental issues are decisionally complex 
because of the number of actors whose choices matter, and the ways their choices and 
preferences can interact. Important outcomes are determined by the decisions of many 
agents. whose scale of concern and authority can range from the local to the global. These 
agents' interests bearing on the issue may be common or conflicting, and are most frequently 
mixtures of the two. Absent international governmental authority, policy decisions must be 
negotiated, and negotiating parties may act strategically. Managing the issues may require 
major institutional changes, which change the rules, authority relationships, and opportunities 
under which large numbers of independent actors operate. Implementing policy may require 
coordinating the actions of many large routinized organizations, as well as further 
negotiation. These various forms of decision complexity would make policy-making 
difficult, even under conditions of full knowledge. 
But full knowledge is not available. Global-change issues are also obscure, in that their basic 
characteristics as policy issues -- the relevant actors, their choices, the consequences of 
'Many authors have identified these two kinds of difficulties, under various names, as central to the problem 
of global environmental management (e.g., Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1985; Lee, 1993). Clark (1986, p. 12) 
expressed them by imagining the earth as a garden: decision complexity as the problem of deciding what kind 
of  garden we want; and obscurity as the problem of determining what kind of garden il is possible to have. 
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choices, relevant causal relations, and the values at stake -- can be uncertain, unrecognized, 
or contested. Obscurity includes, but is broader than, uncertainty about the biophysical world, 
which limits understanding of the causal links between decisions and valued consequences. 
In addition, agents may or may not recognize the issue, or conceive it in the same way. Their 
sct of relevant choices and actions, as well as their preferences and values, may bc 
ambiguous, poorly known, contested, or rapidly changing. They may or may not recognize 
how their decisions contribute to the issue, or their interests in it. The consequences of their 
choices may lack salience because they fall on people who are unidentified or physically 
remote. 
The difficulties posed by the complexity and obscurity of global environmental issues are 
compounded by the issues' long time horizons and global spatial scale. These factors increase 
the number of people and institutions involved in decision-making, widen the distance 
between actions and consequences, and ensure that significant consequences of present 
choices arc borne by people not represented in the decision-making because they are not yet 
born (Brown Weiss, 1989). Complexity and obscurity also interact, in that knowledge and 
uncertainty are typically unequally distributed among relevant actors, and are subject to 
partisan exploitation. 
1.2. The Knowledge Needs of Global Environmental Policy 
Policy issues vary in their knowledge needs. Issucs without substantial scientific or technical 
content, or that arc routine, low-stakes, or primarily distributive, may bc effectively informed 
through normal sounding of political preferences, and hence may not require assessment. 
Issucs with high stakes and significant scientific content may require assessmcnt, but if the 
relevant choices and goals are clear and uncontested (or imposed), the mission of assessment 
is also relatively clear: providing expert judgment on the feasibility of choices, and on 
instrumental relations between choices and goals. For example, could technological 
improvements raise the fuel economy of the new US automobile ileet to 32 miles per gallon? 
What would be the effect on vehicle safety? Could this goal be accomplished through raising 
the fuel economy standards? At what cost, and with what other consequences?3uch 
information is presumed normally available from appropriately chosen groups of scientific 
and technical experts, while active bodies of research and scholarship have considered the 
related questions of what to do when the experts cannot answer, cannot answer in time or 
specifically enough, or cannot agree (e.g., Weinberg 1972; Ravetz 197 1; Brooks, 1987). 
But the goals of assessment are only so straightforward under very restrictive, and rarely met, 
conditions. Even if only instrumental statements are sought, these usually depend not just on 
information about the world -- dynamics of atmosphere and oceans, ecosystems, 
biogeochemical cycles, and the properties of technologies -- but also on information about 
people -- behavioral, strategic, and political knowledge about the potential choices, 
preferences, capacities, and strategies of other actors who matter. For unless an assessment's 
audience is an omnipotent dictator, the consequences of their choices will depend on how 
'This simple view of assessment, estimating consequences of well-defined pol~cy choices for a known set of 
valued consequences, is employed for pedagogical clarity in the classic texts on systems analysis and policy 
analysis ( e . ~ . ,  Miser and Quade 1985; Stokey and Zeckhauser, 1978), but also appears in many discussions of 
assessment and policy in which such a simple model is not appropriate (e.g., CENR 1994). 
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others choose and react. If the others who matter are numerous enough, and act through 
markets meeting the requisite conditions, their reactions can be projected without thinking 
strategically. But if the others who matter are few, large, and make discrete strategic choices, 
this is not so. The consequences of a US decision to raise fuel economy standards cannot be 
assessed without considering the responses of the automakers, nor the consequences of a US 
carbon tax without considering the response of OPEC. These unknowns might be called 
"strategic uncertainties". 
Under the conditions of obscurity and complexity that typically characterize global 
environmental issues, the potential knowledge needs of policy -- and hence the potential jobs 
of assessment -- become broader, more various, and more difficult to discharge. The 
questions assessment might seek to answer, or  the knowledge needs of policy, can be 
disaggregated into eight categories: the two identified in the preceding paragraphs, plus six 
others. 
1) Framing: for an issue that is novel and little understood, identifying its basic 
character, bounding its importance, and determining what questions to ask; 
2) Agendas: clarifying what set of actors, contributing factors, causal relationships, 
impacts, values, links with other issues, and responses, are plausible and relevant; 
identifying new ones to add to, and current ones to drop from, the agenda; 
3) Scenarios: Identifying reasonable assumptions for future trends in background 
variables that will mediate the consequences of particular choices, such as broad 
population, economic, technological, political, and social trends. Because these 
trends affect many issues, assessments of particular issues normally adopt such 
projections from official sources or prior modeling projects.' 
4) Instrumental Relations: predicting the consequences of particular choices for 
particular valued consequcnces; such predictions arc normally contingent on 
particular scenarios, and specify choices as changes in emissions, behavior, o r  
technology, rather than as policies intended to elicit such changes; 
5) Valuation: defining values of, and tradeoffs among, relevant consequences; 
6) Ordinary Uncertainty: Describing probabilities of unknown events and probability 
distributions of unknown quantities; characterizing how much is known, and how 
confidently, about relevant natural systems; 
7) Strategic uncertainty: projecting the consequcnces of choices or actions by some 
actors for the actions of others, and hence for aggregate changes in emissions, 
behavior, or  technology; 
8) Guiding enquiry: ldentifying and prioritizing key policy-relevant knowledge needs, 
to direct subsequent research. 
'Consistency of background assumptions across projections and assessments for distinct policy issues is not 
often achieved. 'l'his was the original purpose of the global 2000 project (Barney, 1982). 
-4- 
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There is a natural, though only partial, temporal ordering among these classes of knowledge 
needs. Some clarification of the basic character of an issue and what questions to ask must 
precede any attempt to inform decisions. Determining what set of sources, impacts, 
responses, and background scenarios to consider must precede attempts to determine 
instrumental relations. This relationship is not, and should not be, unidirectional or linear. 
Adopting and keeping the problem characterization that first comes to mind, or was imposed, 
runs the risk of considering a prematurely and inappropriately restricted set of factors and 
choices, and hence giving precise answers to the wrong questions. 
Meeting these knowledge needs for global environmental change issues poses two 
requirements that merit emphasis. First, useful answers to many or all of these questions will 
require integrating knowledge from a wide set of disciplines and domains, often with wide 
variation in the degree of confidence or precision attainable. Useful assessment methods must 
be able to accommodate such integration. Second, answers involving judgments of value or 
significance depend on one's perspective: one cannot answer "how important is climate 
change", without specifying how important for whom. Hence, useful assessment methods 
must permit examination of the issue from multiple perspectives. 
2 Conventional Assessment Methods 
For global environmental issues, the importance of assessment, and for assessment methods 
that integrate knowledge from disparate domains, has been widely recognized (Clark, 1986; 
Dowlatabadi and Morgan, 1995; Parson, 1995; Nakicenovic et al, 1994). The past five years 
have seen a great deal of assessment activity on global climate change, but nearly all this 
activity still follows two classic, conventional methods that have dominated both practice and 
research for twenty years: formal integrated models, and expert advisory panels. Official 
assessment for climate change is dominated by expert panels, assembled internationally by 
the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and nationally by a variety of 
bodies; research interest in climate assessment is dominated by the development of 
increasingly ambitious formal integrated-assessment models. This section summarizes the 
characteristics, strengths, and weaknesses of these two methods. 
2.1 Formal Assessment  Models: 
Formal computer modeling is the most active area of research activity on assessment of 
climate change (Weyant et al, 1996; Rotmans et al, 1996; Parson, 1995). Such models are 
widely used as research tools in the social and natural sciences, and have been widely used -- 
and widely criticized -- for assessment in other policy domains, such as energy, security, and 
military planning (Brewer and Shubik, 1979; Greenberger, Crenson, and Crissey, 1976; 
Greenbergcr, Brewer, and Hogan, 1983). When used for global change, such models draw 
components from specific disciplinary models, most often from atmospheric sciences and 
energy economics, and inherit their integrating mission from the "World Models" of the 
1970s (Forrester, 1971; Meadows et al, 1972; Ashley, 1983). They have been used for two 
global-change issues: long-range air pollution, particularly acid deposition (Alcamo et al, 
1990; Gough et al, 1994); and since 1990, climate change. 
Since the IMAGE 1.0 model (Rotmans 1989), there have been about twenty projects to 
construct integrated-assessment models of climate change (IPCC). These models pursue end- 
to-end integration of the climate issue by coupling either preexisting models, or simple 
heuristic models custom-developed, to form a causal chain from the determinants of 
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emissions to the valuation of impacts. They hence must combine, at least rudimcntarily, 
knowledge about the following factors: thc human activities that drive greenhouse gas 
emissions; the atmospheric, oceanic, and biological processes that link emissions to 
atmospheric trace-gas concentrations; the radiative and dynamic processes that link trace-gas 
concentrations to global and regional climate; the ecological, economic, and socio-political 
processes that link changed climate to impacts that people or societies care about; and the 
processes by which such valuations are made. Some integratcd-assessment projects also seek, 
in preliminary form, to close the causal loop back to the dcterminants of emissions, by 
modeling the emissions changcs from ecosystem response to climatic and atmosphcric 
change, and/or human adaptation, particularly through land-use change. Somc seek to 
examine uncertainty by specifying probability distributions for unknown quantities and 
propagating uncertainty through cascaded models. Most, though not all, use exogenously 
specified scenarios for non-C02 emissions, and for those aspects of the problem not modeled 
explicitly, which often include population change, technological change, and economic 
productivity growth. 
Such integrated-assessment models provide an assessment framework that can be used, 
depcnding on particular model characteristics, in four ways: to project the consequences of 
particular policy choices; to idcntify Icast-cost policy choices to meet a specified atmospheric 
or environmental constraint; to balance costs and monetized benefits of emissions abatement, 
permitting the identification of optimal abatement levels; or, given explicit treatment of 
uncertainty, to idcntify priority policy-relevant uncertainties so as to help guide research 
priorities. 
Earlier use of formal models for assessment, particularly in energy policy and military 
planning, has been charged with several serious faults: concealing bias; using inadequate 
data; appearing to transccnd adversarial processes while merely shifting them out of public 
view; and directing attention away from the input assumptions, often the most important part 
of an analysis (Brcwcr, 1986; Brcwer and Shubik, 1979). Relative to this carlier work, 
current modeling for integrated assessment of global climate represents a substantial 
improvement in intellectual integrity, mostly through greater circumspection about predictive 
claims, and a shift in the use of models toward exploring, characterizing, and prioritizing 
policy-relevant uncertaint ies .~ut  his current work also shows very serious limitations. 
Some of these limitations, widely recognized by the modcling community, arc weaknesses of 
representation. Current integrated-assessment models of climate changc are weak in their 
representation of climate impacts and adaptation, of policies and responses, and of the basic 
drivers of long-term cmissions trends, particularly demographic and technological change. 
Some of these weaknesses reflect computational limits and analytic tractability, while others 
reflect limited underlying understanding of basic processes. These are the arcas of most 
vigorous work in the assessment modeling community. Other limitations, less widely 
recognized and more essential to the process of model-building, affect the range of 
knowledgc needs that assessment models can reasonably be expected to address. These are 
discussed in Section 2.3 below. 
'This approach was present in Nordhaus and Yohe (1983), and is explicitly advocated in Dowlatabadi and 
Morgan (1993), and I-Iopc (1993). Using IA models for this purpose turns one of the strongest earlier 
criticisms of integrated modeling, that they rely on inadequate data, on its head: models can be used to assess 
the data, and to identify priority policy-relevant areas for getting better data. 
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2.2 Multidisci~linarv Expert Panels 
As an alternative to formal modeling, the collected expert judgment of people whose 
knowledge and experience span the domains relevant to the problem can be gathered together 
through senior advisory panels. This is the most venerable approach to assessment, practiced 
on global environmental issues since their initial appearance on policy agendas in the early 
1970s and much longer on other science and technical-intensive policy issues (Grobecker et 
al, 1974; SCEP, 1970; SMIC, 197 1). 
In recent years such bodies for global environmental issues are increasingly established under 
international auspices and have formal standing in international policy-making. The most 
ambitious examples are the Montreal Protocol Assessment Panels, which have recently 
completed their third full assessment process, and the IPCC, which has recently completed its 
second. Similar bodics, operating on a smaller scale or more recently established, exist for 
several other issues. 
Such bodies typically review and summarize various fields of knowledge, possibly drawing 
on formal models as well as disciplinary knowledge. They may draw collective judgments of 
likely consequences, feasibility, significance, or relevance based on this knowledge, to 
answer specific questions about the implications of policy choices. 
A crucial part oP thcir work is drafting policy-makers' summaries, in which they distill the 
most significant implications of the knowledge they have gathered for policy. This process 
can rcprescnt a difficult negotiation, for finding language to scrvc the knowlcdgc nccds of 
policy-makers may require statements that would not normally bc acceptable in scientific 
debate, duc to their breadth, their normative content, or their explicit charactcrization of the 
confidence with which certain things are known. 
Such bodies contribute principally through their reports. These can be valuable and 
important, not least as educational reading for newcomers to an issuc. Morcover, they can bc 
an effective synthesis method when they reach consensus, cffectively removing certain 
questions from contention (Clark, 1986). But as procedural devices that seek to draw on 
broad-ranging expert authority to serve policy-making, they lie between the domains of 
science and politics, and hence are liable to attack (eithcr sincere or partisan) on grounds 
drawn from eithcr domain. For example, the IPCC Scientific (WG 1) reports have been 
charged both by climate-change skeptics with corrupting scientific process by responding to 
political pressures; and by negotiators and NGOs from developing countries with non- 
representative, and hence politically illegitimate, membership (Risbey et al, forthcoming; 
Lunde, 1992). 
To contribute effectively to policy debate, panel reports must be able to withstand both such 
kinds of attack. Consensus on the panel is normally a necessary (though not sufficient) 
condition for this robustness. Because of the importance of consensus, panels employ various 
methodological and management devices to help attain it. They may, for example, dilute 
statements to a level of vagueness and generality that raises no objections, and hence fail to 
present points sharply enough to yield rclevance to decision-makers. 
Another consensus-building device is to shorten the causal chain of the issue, restricting 
enquiry to areas where uncertainty is manageable and consensus is strong. In both the 
Montreal Protocol and the IPCC, this process has yielded "Science" Panels that consider only 
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certain aspects of atmospheric science. Even other areas of natural science, particularly those 
concerned with ecosystem impacts, are placed in separate working groups with separate 
reports, and in some assessments omitted entirely. Despite widespread current endorsement 
of "integrated assessment", this approach in effect yields dis-integrated assessment, leaving 
the hard and complex task of re-integrating information about atmospheric science, impacts, 
and policies -- if it is undertaken at all -- to the audiences of the assessment. 
2.3. Knowledqe Needs Filled and Unfilled bv Conventional Methods. 
Both formal models and expert panels can make useful and important contributions to 
assessment, but both have important weaknesses and gaps in meeting many of the knowledge 
needs of global environmental issues identified in Section 1.2 above. These weaknesses are 
not absolute, since neither of these methods is a precise single thing and particular 
ad-justments of process, methods, or organization can help mitigate any particular weakness. 
But there are certain knowledge needs that these methods are well suited to meet, and others 
that they are not. 
Formal models are particularly strong for characterizing instrumental relations, for 
characterizing ordinary uncertainty, and hence (with some limits) for identifying key 
uncertainties and guiding enquiry. They may also be of some use in valuing consequences, 
since under the stringent assumptions necessary to justify valuation through willingness-to- 
pay methods and benefit-cost analysis, they can identify tradeoffs and welfare-maximizing 
policies. 
But formal assessment models are of little use on the other assessment dimensions. In seeking 
to understand problems that are not well-posed, formal models cannot help and may hurt. 
They cannot help because what questions to ask must largely be specified in model design. 
They may hurt because in the course of model-building, a specific, restrictive, and 
unexamined set of choices may be made by default, effectively imposing onc definition on 
the problem, its boundaries of relevance, or the goals of policy. 
Because formal models require economy of representation, they are not well suited to 
expanding the set of options, responses, or contingencies considered.' Nor are they useful in 
representing strategic or behavioral uncertainty; indeed, their weakness in representing 
policies and their effects is partly a consequence of this more general weakness.Yn current 
assessment modeling, strategy and behavior appear only implicitly, in the external 
specification of scenarios (e.g., suppose all nations reduce their emissions by 20%). 
Formal models can effectively integrate knowledge from domains that permit precise 
specification of quantitative and causal relationships, but cannot readily integrate qualitative, 
intuitive, or strategic knowledge except to the extent that it can be credibly represented as 
probability distributions. Moreover, they are unlikely to yield to even the best-intentioned 
attempts to make them pluralistic in the viewpoints, values, and intuitive causal models they 
incorporate. Two current projects to put alternative subjective valuation criteria or 
-There arc conditions under which models can help with this task, if the process of formalizing facilitates 
searching systematically over the space of relevant options; but this mitigating factor is narrow, and arises 
infrequently. 
'It also partly reflects the limited spatial and sectoral scale of current integrated-assessment models, which 
make it impossible to represent reasonably complex and realistic policy responses. 
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probability distributions into models may hold some promise of progress, but the 
fundamental problem remains that it is hard for modelers to get inside other peoples' heads 
(Dowlatabadi, 1995; van Asselt and Rotmans, 1996). 
Expert assessment panels can make useful contributions to knowledge needs through 
bringing forward and integrating identified pieces of knowledge; through finding plausible, 
authoritative projections of background information; through combining these to project 
consequences; and through characterizing the state of knowledge and prioritizing knowledge 
needs, though working with formal modeled representations of uncertainty can be of great 
help in the latter task. 
In meeting the more open-ended knowledge needs -- framing and characterizing ill-posed, 
novel problems, and identifying risks, sources, contingencies, impacts, values, and responses 
-- panels' performance is of variable quality; some bodies hold to an inappropriate initial 
characterization of the problem, while others work hard to ask whether they are posing the 
right questions. Most panels favor considering specific issues and options already on the 
agenda, rather than seeking to identify new ones. This conservatism may, though, reflect 
panels' specific mandate and formal advisory role to an authoritative decision-making body, 
rather than an intrinsic weakness of expert panels as an assessment process. Such a setting, in 
which a panel's report or even the content of their deliberations may meet political criticism, 
discourages free-wheeling generation of issues and options, or consideration of alternative 
problem framings (Fisher and Ury, 198 1). The political body may be daunted by the issue's 
complexity and so want the panel to resolve questions and remove issues from the list, not 
add new ones and make their lives still harder. Moreover, if the political body is sufficiently 
broad and diverse, any particular issue, option, or impact a panel raises may offend some 
political actor who wishes they had not. Panel members may know they can escape certain 
forms of attack if they stay precisely within the terms of their charge, but are vulnerable as 
soon as they stray outside. In general, free searching over ill-formed questions, or any 
contributions in thc form of ideas, suggestions, or possibilities, rather than authoritative 
answers or summaries, are best provided by an assessment process well insulated from direct 
lines of political authority. 
The experiences of both the IPCC and Montreal Protocol panels support this contention. 
II'CC Working Group 3, in which some chapter teams sought to avoid controvcrsy by writing 
general academic-style reviews of currently discussed policy approaches, still had to defend 
themselves against delegations who did not want certain options mentioned at all. The 
Montreal Protocol Technology Panel has done an admirable job of searching for and 
identifying specific substitution technologies for ozone-depleters, but has done it by taking 
refuge behind specific charges, including definition of criteria for, e.g., "availability" of a 
technology, provided by the parties. 
Similar difficulties confront panels in assessing strategic uncertainties. Such assessments 
depend on judgments and speculations of what choices by particular actors are plausible or 
likely. When panels report to a pluralistic political body, many such judgments or 
speculations are liable to offend somebody in the room. They are also likely to require modes 
of thought and work different from the normal business of committees or panels, including 
serious efforts to put oneself inside other people's heads. This can best be facilitated through 
approaches that bring together diverse expertises and views, shake people up, provoke non- 
conventional thinking, and let people have fun, which conventional panel deliberations are 
unlikely to provide. 
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In summary, therc arc several important classes of knowledge needs, highly salient for global 
environmental policy issues, that current conventional assessment methods -- models and 
panels -- are not well equipped to provide. Moreover, current research on, and criticism of, 
these methods are not targeting these omissions. Most current work on assessment models 
seeks better representation of uncertainties, technological change, and impacts. Most current 
reflcctions on assessment panels consists of either specific criticism of their membership and 
reports, or attempts to deconstruct their scientific authority and objectivity by demonstrating 
social and political processes influencing their membership, process, and reports. Neither of 
thcse lines of work addresses the omissions identified here. 
One further problem common to both formal models and cxpert panels is obtaining 
consensus estimates of the values, or probability distributions, of unknown physical 
parameters or other facts. Models require specified point estimates or distributions for all 
input parameters, and are of limited help in developing them (though in somc cases estimates 
can be obtained as outputs of other models, assuming that these models' inputs are specified). 
Pancls may tabulatc published estimates for unknown physical quantities or summarize these 
to a range, but they rarely aggregatc them to a consensus cstimate or distribution and the 
working proccss of a panel provides no systematic way to pursue this. 
Two approaches have been takcn to this problem, one computational and one procedural: 
formal combination of individual judgmcnts dcrivcd through cxpert elicitation; and 
procedural deviccs to promote consensus, of which the bcst-known is Delphi. 130th are 
deviccs to gcnerate a single cstimatc or distribution (or at least a grcatly narrowcd range) 
from a divergcnt set. Expert elicitation seeks to generatc carcfully constructcd and consistent 
rcpresentations of individual experts' subjective probabilities. Combining such estimates is 
formally simple, but controvcrsial -- principally for the inevitable arbitrariness in deciding 
which expcrts to include and how to weight them, and for thc associated presumption that the 
probability of a view being true is proportional to thc number of cxperts who hold it (Patc- 
Cornell, 1996; Keith. 1996). 
Dclphi is a procedural approach to the same problcm, iterated expert polling with 
unattributcd sharing of responses betwecn rounds. Estimates generally convcrgc ovcr 
successive rounds, but this may reflcct subtle pressures for conformity in addition to (or 
instead of) genuine development of consensus. 
These methods both extend the range of conventional assessment methods, but they address 
the narrow problem of dissent over specific factual knowledge, not the broader weaknesses 
discussed here. In a variant of Delphi that is widely regarded as more useful, full (but still 
anonymous) arguments for each participants' estimates are exchanged bctween rounds, rather 
than the estimates alone. This variant has some commonality with the alternative assessment 
methods proposed here, which are discussed in the next section. 
3. Alternative Assessment Methods. 
There exists a sct of alternative methods for assessment and synthesis. which can help some 
of these areas of knowlcdge needs in which conventional methods are weak. Thus far, these 
methods have seen littlc application to global environmental issues, though thcse issues 
appear particularly suitable for them. The methods have accumulated substantial experience 
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in other policy domains, which has revealed both great promise and a set of characteristic 
risks. 
The origins of these methods lie in military planning,' while other areas of extensive 
application include forcign-policy criscs, emergency management, and competitive corporate 
stratcgy. Related methods are used as research tools in group decision-making and 
bargaining, and for teaching and training (Parson, 1995). 
These methods can take various forms. Their varieties include exercises in which participants 
construct, elaborate, or critique scenarios, either freely or within constraints, such as Scenario 
Planning or Policy Exercises; exercises in which participants take on roles and tasks -- 
planning, negotiation and decision-making, separately or in teams -- within an imposed 
decision context or scenario, such as Political-Military Exercises or Simulation-Gaming; and 
exercises in which participants collaborate in constructing formal models of a policy issue or 
contested decision that rcflect their collective knowledge, judgments, and values, such as 
Adaptivc Environmcntal Assessmcnt and Management (AEAM) (Schocmaker, 1995; Huss, 
1988; Toth, 1994; Svedin et al, 1987; DeWeerd, 1967; Parson, 1995; Holling, 1978). 
These various forms share basic dcfining characteristics. They arc all representations of a 
complcx decision problem or policy issue; they all involve human participants in dual roles, 
as inquircrs and as objects of study; and they all present a context somewhat removed from 
immediate decision rcsponsibilities -- both in authority, in that thc exercisc is not intcnded to 
advisc authoritative decision-makers on specific decisions, and in substancc, in that thc 
cxcrcise's context is made somewhat hypothetical, sct in the future, set at a diffcrent level of 
abstraction or generality, or in some other way distinguished from immediate decisions. 
Thesc characteristics are claborated below. 
Thc usc of human participants, and participants' dual roles as inquirers and as objects of 
study, are both essential to thcse methods. Participants undertake spccified tasks of planning, 
projcction, negotiation, or decision-making, most often in teams. While thcir dual rolcs arc 
essential, the relative priority of the two roles can vary widely. Participants are inquirers, 
working in partnership with the researchers and dcsigners who create and manage thc 
excrcises. This partnership of enquiry implies that participants' tasks cannot be completely 
spccified, but must leave some latitude for participants to question and revisc the structure 
imposed by designers; and it implies that instructional objcctives are ncver wholly absent 
from such cxcrcises, though not in the simple form of designers teaching specific things to 
participants. Participants are also objects of study, in that how they engage their tasks (both 
in substance and in process) is material for observation and critical reflection, for the exercise 
designers and researchers but also for the participants themselves. If participants arc not 
inquirers but only objects of study, these methods collapse into social-psychological 
"The prominence of these methods in military planning reflects the uniquely hypothetical character of a 
military organization's job. Preparing for infrequent, novel threats requires detailed atlention to contingency 
planniny and rehearsal, to test the organization's responses to hypothesized threats whose character is never 
perfectly predictable, and to develop the necessary coordination of hundreds of different organizational 
routines that comprise the response of a huge, hierarchical military organization (Brewer and Shubik, 1979; 
Bracken, 1990). 
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experirncnts; if participants are not objects of study but only inquirers, these methods 
collapse into seminars, committees, or  expert panels. 
These methods are all representations of a complex policy issue or system by a simpler one 
with relevant behavioral similarity, which permits learning about the complex system by 
observing the simpler one.'"The representation resides partly in the participants and their 
problem-solving, decision-making and ncgotiation, which rcpresent thc behavior of the 
agents and organizations whose actions shape the rcal issue being studied;'' consequently, 
participants must normally have substantial expertise or authority in thc issue. And the 
reprcsentation resides partly in other components of the exercise, including the definition of 
participants' tasks and roles, and other information, scenarios, models, or tools provided. 
Finally, these methods involve displacing participants' attention from their real and 
immediate tasks, roles, identities, and decision contexts. They pose decision situations that 
are fu turc, hypothetical, fictitious, or counter-factual, to move participants outside their 
normal habits and positions, and encourage creative thinking, new ideas, and insights. These 
goals cannot always or reliably be met, but careful choice of participants, control of the 
sctting and context of the exercise, and protection of participants through such measures as 
non-attribution can increase their willingness to explore incompletc idcas and take risks, and 
so make thcse bencfits more likely. Onc implication is that these methods are not appropriate 
when direct advice to authoritative political bodies is required. 
These mcthods are distinguished from formal or mechanical simulations and models, by their 
use of human participants; from social-science experiments and opcrational simulators," by 
participants' role as co-inquirers; from seminars, committees, or panels by their attempt at 
rcprescntation and by participants' role as  objects of study; and from games for amusement 
by their serious assessment purpose and their attempt at sufficient representational realism to 
contribute uscfully to policy and decision. The distinction from games for amusement may 
become increasingly blurred by advances in computer and modeling power, though, which 
permit the development of simulations and games that are ambiguous in both thcir degree of 
represcntational fidelity and their intent. Such simulations, particularly when widely 
distributed, are liable to charges of perpetrating grievous widcsprcad public 
misunderstanding, analogous to the excessive confidcnce formal models have long been 
charged with within regular policy processes (Starr, 1994). 
Other than these defining characteristics, these methods can vary widcly in design. Typical 
design elements may include various definitions of participants' tasks, roles, relationships, 
and the rules under which they operate; rich scenarios that provide context for participant 
decisions; various means of treating time and uncertainty, working forward or backward, or 
covering the same situation repeatedly under different conditions; formal models that provide 
information, projections, analysis, or consequences of participant decisions; and a control 
'"his is drawn from Brewer and Shubik's (1979) definition of "simulation", p.9 
'In the classic division of simulations into "all-person", "person-machine", and "all-machine" exercises, the 
methods discussed here include the "all-person" and "person-machine" types. "All-machine" simulations 
correspond to physical or computer models. 
"Such as aue used for training and design in complex systems such as commercial aircraft or nuclear power 
plants. 
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team that determines consequences of participants' decisions, represents the decisions of 
other actors and nature, and injects surprises. 
One important design variant is that such methods may have more or less of the character of 
a "game". While some authors argue that the hypothetical character of these methods makes 
them all games, it is more common to define games by some combination of the following 
conditions: structure and rules guiding participants' choices;" outcomes determined as the 
collective consequences of decisions made separately; and separate participants or teams 
planning and deciding without knowing what others are planning and deciding (Schelling, 
1964; Levine, 1964a, b; Shubik, 1975). 
Since the 1960s there have been recurrent periods of vigorous development of such methods 
(under various names), and of enthusiastic, sometimes excessive claims of what they can 
achieve, punctuated by intermittent harsh evaluations of the intellectual integrity and utility 
of the methods as practiced.14 The following sections argue how these methods can be useful 
in global environmental policy, why they may make a incremental contributions to 
understanding, and how to avoid or mitigate their most serious risks and weaknesses. 
4. Usinq Alternative Methods for Global Environmental Chanqe 
Because global environmental issues have high stakes, and because conventional assessment 
methods 1'dl short of meeting important knowledge needs, novel or unconventional methods 
have a presumption in their favor. If they can plausibly offer to advance understanding, 
particularly with respect to the knowledge needs where conventional methods are weak, they 
are presumptively worth exploring and developing. 
But such a presumption can only take you so far. A serious case to try a novel method cannot 
rest entirely on an argument so generic that it would equally support consulting oracles and 
fortune-tellers -- though these assessment methods have been employed by political leaders 
both ancient and modern. The methods proposed here keep bad company, and have a record 
of intemperate claims and mis-applications (Smith 1987). Consequently, an argument for 
their serious development and use, and for granting them the time and attention of busy 
senior participants, must make the case that they are unlikely to do much harm," and that 
13 Of course, rules may be provisional. It is of the essence of participants role as "enquirers" that they be 
permitted to over-ride, revise, or at least critique, the rules. 
'"he long-standing criticisms include excessive and confused claims, bias, arbitrary assumptions, using bad 
or unverifiable data, poor documentation, no peer review, and little progress in development of professional 
standards. See for example, Levine (1964a); Schultz and Sullivan (1972); Brewer and Shubik (1979); and 
Meadows and Robinson (1985). 
"Certain biased or polemical applications of simulation exercises and war games have caused, or risked, 
grave harm. Bracken (1977) reports two instances: rigged Japanese naval war-games prior to the battle of 
Midway being used to mislead senior decision-makers into authorizing the engagement; and highly 
conservative, worst-case estimates of UK air casualties being publicized and causing grave harm to morale. In 
one chilling example, the U. Md. Nuclear History Program (1992, p. 302) reports a US Air Force war game 
whose director drew the conclusion that the US could selectively use nuclear weapons on military targets to 
Porce concessions Prom the USSR without escalating to general nuclear war. 
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there are specific reasons to expect them to make a positive contribution to understanding or 
policy-making. Such a specific argument would have to engage the particular difficulties and 
knowledge needs of global environmental problems, the weaknesses of conventional 
assessment methods, and the characteristics of the proposed methods. 
The proposed methods have two characteristics that help them address these unmet 
knowledge needs. Relative to both panels and formal models, the alternative methods arc 
better able to incorporate diverse preferences, conceptions, and normative perceptions; and 
they arc able to integrate (weakly) across a broader set of knowledge domains. 
It is by including diverse participants that these methods can incorporate multiple 
perspectives. Participants carry their disparate perspectives on the issue, both positive and 
normative, into the exercise with them. These methods integrate "procedurally", posing 
collective tasks that clarify participants' views and force them to engage each others'. The 
collective tasks can take many forms. They can include, for example, collective decisions, 
projects, negotiations, arguments, or constructing projections or narratives. These are all 
sufficiently broad and demanding that participants' knowledge, expert judgment, opinions, 
preferences and values are all relevant, and must interact. The consequence is a more 
engaged consideration of multiple perspectives, and one that more effectively reflects diverse 
normative perspectives as well as distinct bodies of positive knowledge, than can normally be 
accomplished by conventional forms of group work or assessment. 
Moreover, these methods avoid the most common failing of Delphi and simple aggregation 
of expert judgment, the hrcing of diverse views to a single blend or an inappropriate 
consensus. For example, the playing out of adversarial roles can push participants to detailed 
articulation and development of their views, permitting both the identification of potential 
points of commonality and clarification of the basis of dissent. Alternating between 
adversarial and collegial roles can facilitate identifying the presumptions on which disparate 
views are based, new pieces of data or evidence that would change actors' views or favor 
particular choices, or policy options that are robust to particular forms of dissent.' These 
benefits are all advanced by the heterogeneity of the participants. Indeed, many of the 
benefits of these methods come from the alternation or exchange of roles, as participants 
observe, question, and learn from each other, and experience decision problems from 
multiple perspectives. ~ 
Similar arguments support the ability of these methods to integrate positive knowledge across 
a broader range of domains. Participants bring their experience, knowledge, professional 
training, and intuitive judgment about both scientific and technical matters, and behavioral, 
strategic, and political uncertainties. These methods can provide a variety of means for 
synthesis and integration of such knowledge. 
1 6  I t  is instructive to note that for the problem of judicial decision-making, which is also contcntious and 
uncertain, though typically low-sttakes for society (high-stakes for the individuals involved), the conventional 
solution is to rely on a set of process rules for admitting and weighing cvidcncc, and deciding who has 
authority to decide and what procedures they must follow in deciding -- in effect, abandoning the search for 
authoritat~ve right answers and relying on the process. Various proposals to base high-stakes social or political 
decision-making on similar procedural I'oundations (e.g., the "Science courts" proposal of early 1980s) have 
been decisively and repeatedly rejected. 
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Moreover, knowledge can be brought into such exercises by other vehicles than the minds of 
the participants. Relevant information can be provided through briefing materials, decision- 
support tools, or formal modcls, and integrated into collective outcomes and insights to the 
extent that participants engage it. Indeed, combining formal assessment tools such as models 
into these methods can permit focused, demanding testing of the policy-relevancc and 
usefulness of the tools and models. 
Relative to conventional assessment methods, the altcrnativc methods proposed here better 
incorporatc multiple perspectives, and can integrate knowledge from a broader set of 
domains. In addition, they pose decision situations somewhat removed from the immediate 
policy agenda, and they manifest the unpredictability that comes from generating collective 
outcomes from separate centers of decision. Together, these charactcristics encourage both 
the generation of novelty -- from thcir intrinsically unpredictable character, and from their 
stimulation of individual and group creativity -- and the critical examination and refinement 
of ideas and insights that are generated. 
Consequcntly, thesc mcthods are well suited to both the generation and the critical 
examination of new ideas and insights on precisely the dimensions of knowledge needs that 
arc ill met by convcntional assessment methods. They can help specify and clarify the basic 
character of an issuc, hclp elaborate and refine lists of relevant sources, impacts, responses 
and contingencies, and idcntify overlookcd factors and connections. Through observation and 
retlection on the interactions of participants' decisions, acting in sclf-intcrcsted roles and 
under relevant constraints, these methods can provide more useful insights into strategic 
unccrtainties -- plausible choices by significant actors, and their consequcnccs for other 
actors -- than mere speculation, even by the same group of people. 
Insights from such methods may take the form of changed views of relative importance of 
different aspects of the problem; promising new ideas for negotiating stanccs, dcsign of 
policies, institutions, or rcsponses to specific contingencies; or newly recognized plausible 
consequcnces of spccific proposed initiatives, including unanticipatcd potential pitfalls. If the 
excrcise attains sufficient rcpresentational fidelity, thesc insights arc likely to be of relevance 
to the rcal problcm. Many of thesc come from the unpredictable character of such methods, 
and thcir ability to help extend thc list of "things you would never havc thought of" 
(Schclling, 1964). 
Examples of such insights gained from these rncthods are highly divcrse. Schelling (1964) 
reports a military crisis exercise concerning Soviet invasion of northern Iran in which one 
military planner realized that the supply of jet fuel readily available in Teheran was ten times 
larger than had been thought, because kerosene (an acceptable substitute) was used for 
domestic cooking. In a 1990 simulation of reorganization of the UK National Health system 
to create internal markets, budget pressures led the newly created health-care purchasers to 
prcss hospitals to lower quality of care, revealing the unanticipated necessity of advance 
negotiations to dcvelop quality indices and allocate responsibility for health objectives 
among thc newly crcated institutions (East Anglia Regional Health Authority, 1990). A series 
of simulated negotiations on international emissions trading for global climate change 
revealed sharp disparities among developing nations in their ability to trade, and competition 
for resources betwcen emissions markets and administrative financial mechanisms like the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) (Parson, 1992). 
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In sum, these methods are strong in precisely the areas where conventional methods of 
assessment are weak: issucs whose basic character and rclevant factors are not well 
understood; issues on which the values at stake are unclear, ambiguous, or contested; and 
issues for which some of the basic uncertainties concern behavior, strategy, or values. 
Moreover, the origins of insights within such exercises are transparent once they arise. If 
something happens, you can ask why; if some insight arises, you can ask what made it seem 
persuasive within the context of the exercise, and what conditions would weaken or reverse 
it. Hence, insights from such exercises are subject to discussion, questioning, refinement, and 
to a limited extent, testing -- at least by the criteria of plausibility to the expert participants 
and observers. 
5. Problems and Challenaes: 
Attaining the benefits summarized above from these methods poses serious design 
challenges, and there arc many ways to err. 
The two most basic potential sources of potential for error in thcsc methods also afilict 
conventional assessment methods: bias, and too-confident generalization from small samples. 
Both participants and designers can introduce bias. Designers can introduce bias in the choice 
of participants, in unintentional hints, in the structure of the exercise, or in the basic 
definition of what is deemed relevant and essential (DeWeerd, 1975). Even without 
systematic bias in design or participants, all implementations of thcsc methods represent 
small samples of highly rich, complex events. Under these conditions, much of what is 
experienced is non-generalizable variance, so general conclusions must be drawn from such 
methods only with the utmost caution. 
Both these risks are exacerbated by the experiential vividness of these methods, which tend 
to lend excessive confidence to the lessons drawn from each implementation. This risk may 
be no worse, though, than the widely observed tendency of decision-makers to draw too- 
confident inferences from vivid historical images, or their own prior experiences, both of 
which arc also tiny samples of complex events (Etheredge 1985). Indeed, the possibility of 
these methods to incorporate diverse perspectives, and the possibility of reviewing particular 
problems or scenarios repeatedly under different conditions, both suggest that the risk of 
excessive generalization may be less pronounced from these methods than from real-life 
experience. 
An important defense against both kinds of error is distinguishing clearly between the 
heuristic goals these methods can plausibly attain, and the stronger goals -- principally 
prediction and hypothesis testing -- that they cannot, and the pursuit of which is liable to lead 
to serious errors (Brewer 1990; Parson, 1995). Even attaining the heuristic benefits, though, 
depends on the method's attaining a sufficiently persuasive level of relevant behavioral 
similarity to the issue being studied, while still shaking up participants normal habits of 
thought enough to generate useful insights. In part this similarity depends on the choice of 
participants, for insights from an exercise are only likely as good as the set of participants 
they came from. But this requirement also defines the most basic design tension of such 
methods: keeping the representation close enough to the real issue to be rclevant, while 
separating the decision context enough from the precise present problem to provoke new 
approaches. 
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A further, related challenge, concerns the difficulty of designing settings in which 
participants with the required expertise are willing and able to step out of their roles. Most 
participants who have expertise and authority in the issue also have existing positions and 
relationships with other participants. Bracken (1990) has identified a set of predictable 
pathologies associated with using simulations within large, bureaucratic, hierarchical 
organizations. When participants do not come from a single organization but do have 
established positions and professional relationships, a different but equally serious set of 
pathologies can arise: c.g., refusal to accept the hypothetical premises of the exercise, acting 
so as to bolster preferred views in outside interactions, or withholding or distorting relevant 
information. 
Many of these pitfalls are mitigated by the fact that most implementations of the methods 
advocated here includc a lengthy critical debriefing. In the debriefing, the significance and 
legitimacy of the problems posed is explored; potential implications are considered of 
decisions taken and plausible alternatives not taken; and the relevance and generalizability of 
insights drawn from the exercise are critically examined. Here the critical faculties of both 
participants and designers are fully engaged in criticizing the experience ol' thc exercise, 
rather than living it, and potential design bias, partisan attempts to bias outcomcs by 
participants, and ovcr-strong generalization arc all held up for critical examination. 
The prcccding challenges apply generally, to any use of these methods. Other challcnges arc 
specific to their application to global environmental issues, principally concerned with ways 
that it is difficult on these issucs to attain sufficient rcpresentational realism. 
The first concerns the use of time in assessment exercises. Global cnvironrnental issues 
typically have long time-horizons; the consequences of current choiccs may not be fully 
evident for decades. Consequently, in cxercises in which participants make decisions and 
consequences are determincd by models, designers, or a control team, thc rcquired timc-steps 
between successive decision episodcs must be long and it is hard to avoid a scnse of 
arbitrariness. This may weaken participants' sense of realism and continuity. Of course, not 
all such exerciscs rcquire a continuous realistic narrative sense between episodcs. One may 
decide to manage the exercise more intrusively, in effect making up a new scenario (but one 
that plausibly follows from previous events) for each episode, possibly deciding in advance 
what the most crucial problem will be for each round. This problcm of managing long time- 
horizons makes the use, and the design requirements, of such methods for global 
cnvironrnental policy contrast sharply with their more common use to study crisis response. 
In assessment exercises that require the construction and updating of narrative scenarios over 
time, both designers and participants are likely to be tempted to resort to deus ex machina 
solutions for thc environmental problem studied. Several past implementations of such 
exercises have posited massive technological innovations, or transformative social, political 
and religious movements, that solve the problem studied or make it insignificant. Exploring 
such possibilities can be useful for moving participants out of "business-as-usual" thinking 
and scnsitizing thcm to thc wide range of possibilities that applies over several decades. But 
resorting to these innovations can also let the group off the hook, pcrmitting them to digress 
from difficult but plausible considcrations of how to manage the problem, to speculative 
exploration of major discontinuous events about whose origins and causation essentially 
nothing is known. 
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Finally, the central dependence of global environmental problems on complex and contested 
scicnlific information poscs several specific challenges for the design of such exercises, 
concerned with ways of integrating complex information or formal models into open-ended 
cxercises drivcn by thc participants. Models tend either to become thc centcr of attention of 
the exercise, or to be ignored entircly. When participants use models, they may dcmand 
complex real-time runs that exceed the capacity of the systems available and require rapid 
entry of large quantities of stipulated data, posing scrious risk of errors. In some scttings, 
model inputs or outputs may offend or alienate participants, and may need to bc filtcred for 
acceptability. 
6. Conclusions: 
The alternative assessment methods proposed here are likely to be useful for certain classes 
of decision problems. These include new, ill-posed issues whose charactcr and relevant 
aspects are ill understood or contested; issues for which major institutional changes are 
proposed; and issucs for which the consequences of even rclatively simple or small policy or 
dccision are hard to assess or predict because of the number of affected actors and their rangc 
of potential rcsponses. Global environmental problems clearly have these charactcristics, as 
do other current important policy issues." 
Of course, the benefits plausibly attainable from thcse methods are not guarantccd. In any 
particular implementation of these mcthods thc seemingly ncw insights that arise might on 
reflection be wrong, already well known, or caused by particular arbitrary characteristics of 
thc cxcrcise, and hence not applicablc to real policy or dccision. Thc goals of broad 
integration of knowledge and incorporation of diversc pcrspectives may not be achieved if 
participants cannot undcrstand cach other, argue past each other, or are unable to engagc the 
breadth of information provided. 
Indeed, thc few implementations of such methods so far for global environmental problems 
have provided ample evidence of their expense and difficulty, and the insights they havc 
offered, though real, have been of modest scale. But sincc these methods are meeting an 
important class of knowledge and integration needs that conventional methods alone cannot 
meet, and sincc even the beginning efforts undertaken so far continue to show evidence of 
larger potential contribution, the case for their valuc remains persuasivc. Moreover, the early 
experience gained suggests that the risks and design challenges associated with these methods 
can be effectively mitigated. 
The issues for which such methods are suitable lie in some important ways outside current 
experience, and insights on such questions do not come easily. But the issues are not utterly 
novel; rather, they are typically increases or combinations of elements for which experience 
does exist. It is this character of partial, or intermediate novelty, that makes the proposed 
methods potentially useful. We have some knowledge about biophysical and ecological 
systcms, about thc capabilities of technology and institutions, and about patterns of behavior 
of actors and states, that can help us understand or explain pieces of the problem; but we lack 
"Othcr current policy with similar characteristics, potentially suitable for investigation through methods such 
as proposed here, could include reform of domestic health-care systems; managing fiscal stability of public 
pension systems; and developing new constitutions and institutions for newly independent or transformed 
states. 
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methods to synthesize or integrate these bits of knowledge into a coherent synoptic view 
(Jones, 1985). The role of these methods is linking and integrating, with more flexibility or 
power than standard methods of formal models or expert panels can provide. The 
contribution they can make in the domain of assessment is hence analogous to that argued by 
Guctzkow (1972) in the domain of research inquiry, "bridges linking islands of theory". 
It is also important to note that the extent to which an issue is well posed and understood 
determines what kind of questions can be coherently asked, and what kind of answers arc 
plausibly available. No assessment method can overcome this fundamental limitation, or 
provide useful answers to questions that cannot yet be posed coherently. On issues such as 
global environment, some further, at least provisional, elaboration of the more open-ended 
questions identified as knowledge needs in Section 1.2 must precede attempts to seek, e.g., 
judgments of the specific consequences, or the desirability, of particular policy choices. That 
the more open-ended assessment methods advocated here cannot provide such answers as 
well as more closed methods such as formal models does not indicate a weakness of the 
methods, but rather their greater suitability to the investigation of issues at earlier stages of 
specification. In defending the use of "manual gaming" methods in security studies, a class of 
the methods advocated here, Brewer (1990, p. 99) cites the two complementary 
misunderstandings that afflict such mcthods: failing to appreciate that the loose heuristic 
insights they offer are of great value, particularly for ill-posed problems; and demanding, or 
worse, claiming, that they can offer firm predictive results, when these arc in fact infeasible. 
The appropriate criterion for assessing the utility or effectiveness of any particular exercisc is 
its persuasiveness to those who must make practical use of it: researchers, who will tell 
whether the exercise helps them identify important questions or new hypotheses; and 
practitioners, who will tell whether the insights generated arc useful for their practical 
understanding, or to help them discharge their responsibilities. Evaluating an exercisc this 
way carries some dangers: any skillfully designed and run exercise will provide a vivid, 
intense, and engaging experience for the participants; and its outcomes will be vastly over- 
determined, hence rich in interpretive ambiguity and rife for oracular projections. But the 
heuristic and prospective orientation of these mcthods precludes any more formal testing of 
results for validity, so participants must act as evaluators of the insights generated; indeed, 
this is implied by their basic role as co-inquirers. As with the specific pitfalls identified 
above, a vigorous critical debriefing can mitigate this danger. 
The contribution of the proposed methods is incremental. These methods can make 
contributions that conventional methods as presently practiced cannot, and they differ from 
conventional methods in important ways. But this is not to claim either that the contributions 
of conventional methods are insignificant or that conventional and alternative methods 
cannot be combined or blended. The defining characteristics of the methods discussed here 
are in most cases continuous, not discrete. Indeed, while pure alternative assessment methods 
are feasible and potentially useful, creative hybrids or combinations of conventional and 
alternative methods might plausibly be even more so. Formal models can be integrated into 
more open-ended methods as decision-support tools or to define part of the scenario in which 
participants deliberate. Alternatively, model-development exercises can be designed that 
involve diverse expert participants in the development of scenarios, assumptions, and 
relationships. Expert assessment panels could under some circumstances use simulation, 
scenario, or policy-exercise methods as part of their deliberations. All these hybrid 
approaches are worth exploring. The possibility of adjusting conventional approaches to 
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integrate the alternative methods proposed here is one indication of the potential value of the 
alternatives. 
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